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CHRISTIANITY AS PART OF THE LAW OF
PENNSYLVANIA.
From time to time, dicta appear in the decisions of the courts,
to the effect that Christianity is a part of the law of the land.
In his fourth book,' Blackstone treats "of Offences against
God and Religion," and the fourth species of this class he describes as "blasphemy against the Almighty, by denying his being or providence, or by contumelious reproaches of our Savior,
Christ; whither also may be referred all profane scoffing at the
holy scripture, or exposing it to contempt and ridicule. These
are offences punishable at common law by fine and imprisonment,
or other infamous corporal punishment, for Christianity is part
In the case of Updegraph v. Comof the laws of England."
monwealth2 Duncan, J., declares that Christianity "is and always
has been, a part of the common law of Pennsylvania." Allud3
ing to this declaration, Coulter, J., remarked in 1847, "A great
judge has said that general Christianity is part of the law of this
country, impressed upon its institutions, in which dictum, speaking for myself alone I concur with all my heart and judgment."
In 1867, Strong, J., at Nisi Prius, delivered an opinion in which
he wrote: "Christianity is a part of the common law of this state.
In saying this, I utter no new doctrine. It was part of the common law of England long before this state was settled. The old
common law of England is a part of the common law of this state.
14 Blackstone, page 59.
2 11 S. & R. 394, 1824.
3Brown v. Rummel, 6 Pa. 86.
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Our fathers brought it with them when they settled in the
wilderness and founded this new Commonwealth." 4
Let us see how far, if at all, it is true that Christianity is a
part of the law of Pennsylvania.
By Christianity may be meant, an aggregate of assertions concerning facts, and an aggregate of prescriptions concerning conduct. The composition of these aggregates is susceptible of indefinite variation; and we know, historically, that an almost unclassifiable variety of them has presented itself, from century to
century, each composite calling itself Christianity. It is possible to discover in a large majority of the systems, certain common elements, but whether the absence of any of these would or
would not subject any given system to the forfeiture of the name
Christian, must always be a matter of controversy. Early in
the history of Penn's colony, differences of opinion among admittedly Christian people, were manifest, and for many decades the
state was able to display as large a number of sects and churches,
each calling itself, and being called by its competitors, a Christian church, as any other community. As no.church was established, the state refrained from preferring in any way the
opinions of any one of those various bodies, to those of another.
Those affirmations of fact which distinguished Catholic from
Protestant, Presbyterian from Episcopalian or Congregationalist,
were not in any way favored. As soon therefore as men began
to reflect on the proposition, Christianity is a part of the common law, it was more or less dimly seen that the expression was
extremely vague; that if A's, or B's conception of Christianity
was adopted as the norm, not a whole but only a truncated
Christianity could be said to be a part of the Common Law. Accordingly in Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394, Dun4

Sparhawk v. Union Passenger Railway Co., 54 Pa. 401. In Zeisweis
v. James, 63 Pa. 465, Sbarswood J. declines to discuss the question "under what limitations the principle is to be admitted that Christianity is a
part of the common law" and in Harvey v. Boles, I P & W 12, Gibson
C. J. somewhat discredits the doctrine by remarking "Christianity has
been indefinitely said to be a part of the law of the land." He
also declares that to enforce by the civil arm the laws of a religious society, is "an object foreign to the aim of temporal government." In Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 Howard 127, Story J. observes "It is also
said and truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the common law of
Pennsylvania."
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can, J., tells us, not that the Christianity of the Church of England man, or of the Quaker, Presbyterian, or Methodist, not
even of the Protestant, as contrasted with the Catholic, or of
the Catholic, as contrasted with the Protestant, is a part of the
law, but he tells us that "Christianity, general Christianity, is
and always has been a part of the common law of Pennsylvania;
Christianity without the spiritual artillery of European countries, -not Christianity founded on any particular religious tenets; not Christianity with an established church and titles and
spiritual courts, but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all
men."
In order then to know what Christianity is a part of the
common law, a process of analysis of its various forms would be
necessary, and a selection from them, of certain common elements. Even of the common elements, perhaps not all would be
found to be the Christianity which Judge Duncan had in mind.
We are constrained however to say, that this analysis has never
been made, and that how general the "general Christianity" is
which is part of our law, what are its doctrinal and ethical and
institutional contents, no one has ever yet even endeavored to
tell us.
I have said that Christianity is a body of affirmations concerning great cosmic facts; concerning human conduct, and concerning human destiny as affected by these facts and this conduct.
There are several ways in which Christianity might be said to be
part of the law. The state might in its law make the same affirmations concerning these facts that Christianity makes. It
might reward belief and punish disbelief of them, it might prohibit the denial of them by word or act; it might compel the
doing or the refraining from doing of the acts religious, or unreligious, moral or criminal, which Christianity commands or forbids. We are to inquire whether (and, if any, which of them,)
Pennsylvania has done any of these things.
Let us look first at the Constitution of the State. The 3rd
section of Article I recites that "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences."
The manifest object of this
provision-it occurred in the earlier Constitution in what is
called the "Declaration of Rights' '-was, not to affirm the existence of Almighty God, but to secure the individual freedom in
worship, not to bind men to worship at all, but to preclude legis-

4

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

lative interference with worship. As now understood, it asserts
a natural and indefeasible right not to worship at all, as well as
to worship, if at all, in this or in that mode. The belief in God,
and the worship of him were common phenomena and the object of the clause was not to make a state affirmation concerning
God and the duty of worship, but to prevent the state's government from undertaking to coerce men, in respect to worship.
Again, it is to be recalled that, even if the phrase be a corporate
declaration of the existence of God, that tenet is not peculiar to
Christianity. It is equally fundamental in Judaism, Mohamedanism, and other monotheistic religions. This clause does not
make even "general Christianity" a part of the law. It forbids,
rather the insistence on worship after the Christian form, protecting other forms from legal disabilities of any sort.
The 4th Section of Article I of the Constitution declares that
"no person who acknowledges the being of a God and a future
state of rewards and punishments, shall, on account of his religious sentiments be disqualified to hold any office or place of
trust or profit, under this Commonwealth." The original laws
of the Province required faith in Jesus Christ, as a qualification
for office. The constitution of 1776 dispensed with it, making
eligible any who believed in God.
Then followed a slight
reaction, and the constitution of 1790, made what in Duncan J's
opinion' was the "necessary addition" to the qualifications for
office, viz., a belief in a future state of rewards and punishments.
As thus modified, the religious qualification was continued under
the amendments of 1836, and finally in the constitution of 1874.
Of this section of the constitution, it is enough to say, that it
does not require an acknowledgment of the being of a God and
of a future state, in order to hold office. It prohibits the legislature from disqualifying, on religious grounds any who do
acknowledge these facts. It is not safe even to say that itpjermits
the legislature to disqualify those who do not acknowledge these
facts, for it might well be held that any who have the qualifications of voters under the constitution, cannot be made ineligible
for office, unless the power to make them ineligible is expressly
conferred by the constitution. If however we are to find in this
section of the Constitution a permission to the legislature to disqualify disbelievers in God and post-mortem human existence,
5

Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394.
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it would not follow that the people of the state in it
expressed a corporate judgment that there was a God and a
future state, and that disbelievers therein might possibly be unfit
for office, or that toleration of them in office might possibly lessen the Divine favor towards the state. They might simply
have deemed it wise, seeing that so many people do believe in
God and have suspicion or fear, or contempt or hatred of those
who do not, to allow to the legislature the discretion of making
disbelievers ineligible. We know, of course, that the vast majority of the voters of the state in 1790, in 1873, did believe in
God and a future life, but it by no means results that they intended to give expression to their belief in the organic act. But,
it is again to be remembered that even if they did intend to express this belief, the belief is not characteristically Christian, but
belongs equally to Judaism, Mohamedanism, not to mention
Mormonism, and several great Asiatic religions. They could
not be said to have made Christianity a part of the law of this
state, by enacting the section in question.
It may be well to note the vagueness of the contents of the
belief mentioned in this section. Passing the point that "acknowledging" the being of a God is only inferentially the equivalent of believing in His existence, the belief is of the "being of
a God," and "a future state of rewards and punishments."
Many concepts have been expressed by the word "god."
Which
of them the candidate for office must have, is not defined.
Shall the God believed in, be universal, or limited to the solar
system? all powerful, or only very powerful; all-knowing, or
only knowing very much? Must he be thought to love virtue
and hate vice, or is it enough to think he is indifferent to them,
or even that he loves vice and hates virtue? Must he be thought
eternal and increate, or is it enough to believe him to have
emerged from Chaos, whither after a million of aeons he will go
back? As to the future state of rewards, must it be believed to
be brief or long; must the punishment be thought corporal or
spiritual, keen or slight, constant or intermittent? Must the
punishment be believed to flow from vice, or would a belief that
the Virtuous are punished and the vicious rewarded be enough?
It is unnecessary to pursue these questions. Whatever sense is
put on the clause we are considering, it does not make Christianity a part of the law.
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It remains in this connectipn, to consider the Preamble to.the
Constitution. The preamble to that of 1790 simply declared
"We, the people, of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ordain
and establish this constitution for its government." That of
1873 reads thus: "We, the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, grateful to Almighty God fbr the blessings of civil and
religious liberty, and humbly invoking His guidance, do ordain
and establish this Constitution." This is an expression declaratory of gratitude to God. It is, probably, an implied assertion
of the belief that He guides when His guidance is invoked. But,
these beliefs are not distinctively Christian. They are notably
Jewish and Mohammedan. Besides the preamble is in no sense
a law. It prescribes neither opinion nor conduct. If we accept
the theory that the majority of the voters who voted for the
Constitution intended to say that they were grateful to God,they have expressed their belief in a fact, which while one of the
various aggregations of facts called Christianity, is not peculiar
to them, but is shared by much of the non-Christian world.
Let us pass now, to the consideration of certain statutes. The
act of 1700 against blasphemy 6 was, with few changes, re-enacted
in March 31, 1860,' and runs thus: "If any person shall wilfully,
premeditatedly blaspheme or speak loosely and profanely of
Almighty God, Christ Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or the Scripture of
Truth, such person, on conviction thereof shall be sentenced to
pay a fine not exceeding $100 and undergo an imprisonment not
exceeding three months or either, at the discretion of the court."
We have suggested ways in which Christianity might be a part
of the law. The law might for the state affirm its distinctive
tenets or some of them, might prohibit disbelief or denial of
them; might prohibit denial when accompanied with ridicule,
or contempt, while permitting respectful denial.
It is to be remarked that the statute prohibits a certain way of
speaking about "Christ Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or the Scripture
of Truth." The Scripture includes the New, as well as the Old
Testament, and the act prohibits from verbal depreciation, a
non-Jewish as well as a Jewish, sacred book. Some degree of
reverence for the New Testament, is characteristic of Mohammedanism, but it was plainly not the intention of the statute to
61
7I

Sm. L. 6.
P & L 1123.
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defend the book, because it was respected by that religion, but
because it was believed and respected by the people of Pennsylvania, and probably because in the opinion of the law maker,
the book had the divine qualities which the popular creed assigned to it. The existence of the Holy Spirit is, we may concede a Christian fact, asserted neither by Judaism nor Mohammedanism. To protect him from disparagement either because to
do so would shock the religious sentiments of the people, or because to do so would in the judgment of the law-maker, be an
act of impiety, and because it was incumbent on them, or pleasing to them, to defend a Divine person from belittlement, was an
object'of the act. We think it evident that a part of Christianity, viz., its assertions of the Divine position of Jesus Christ,
of the existence of the Holy Spirit, of the sacredness, truth and
authority of the Scripture, of the duty of veneration towards
these objects, was by this act, made a part of the law of the
Province; that is, Christianity affirmed the existence and certain
attributes of these objects; this statute affirmed them; Christianity
inculcated reverential speech towards these objects; this statute
inculcated reverential speech towards them. So much of Christianity and to such an extent was made a part of the law, no
more, and no further.
The tendency of the American states, during and since the
Revolution was to separate themselves from religion. The Federal Constitution sternly prohibits Congress from passing any
law establishing religion, or prohibiting its free exercise, and it
became more and more clear to political thinkers, that the state
should not in any way require assent to religious tenets, submission to religious prescriptions, or contributions to religious
establishments of any sort. It gradually became felt that the
truth of religious assertions should be as debatable as the truth
of scientific or historical assertions; and that men should be free
so far as the state is concerned to be believing or not, pious or not,
observant of religious rites or not. But the act of 1790 remained
on the statute book unrepealed. The change of the point of view
at length expressed itself in the mode of interpreting this statute.
It is quite likely that those who framed it believed that to deny
the existence of God, or the divine nature, the miraculous birth,
the expiatory virtue of Jesus Christ, the truth of the Scriptures,
would be to blaspheme them, to speak loosely and profanely of
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them. How far from this view the public thought had got as
early as 1824, is discerned in Updegraph v. Commonwealth. 8
Updegraph was indicted because, in the presence of several persons, he premeditatedly, despitefully and blasphemously said
"that the Holy Scriptures were a mere fable; that they were a
contradiction and that although they contained a number of
good things, yet they contained a great many lies." From his
conviction, he appealed to the Supreme Court. That court reversed the sentence, because the word "profanely," the word
used in the act, did not appear in the indictment. Duncan J.,
was also of the.opinion that the indictment should have set out
the very words uttered by the defendant. This shows rather
clearly, a willingness that the prosecutions under the statute
should be infrequent and convictions difficult, for it can rarely
happen, unless a stenographic note is taken at the time, (and in
1824, there were few stenographers) that the very words of the
defendant can be remembered and proved by a witness. After
this laying down of a principle that would make the statute reasonably inert and ineffectual, the writer of the opinion was free
to address himself to the argument that the constitutional provision "The free communications of thoughts and opinions is the
most invaluable of the rights of man, and every citizen may
freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty," repealed the act of 1790; and that,
since religious tests are not recognized in the constitution of
1790, the act is impliedly repealed, because it applied religious
tests to human conduct. It would consume too much space to
quote extensively from this peculiar opinion. In one place there
is an intimation that the object of the statute is to forbid the acts
specified, because Christianity forbids them,9 the statute has
Again it is suggested that the obChristianity for "its object."
ject of the statute is to prevent angering Christians into a breach
of the peace. "It is open, public vilification of the religion of
811 S & R 394.
9

"If the argument (of counsel for defendant) be worth anything, all
the laws which have Christianity for their object,-all would be carried
away at one fell swoop-the act again.t cursing and swearing, and breach
of the Lord's Day; the act forbidding incestuous marriages, perjury by
taking a false oath upon the book, fornication and adultury et peccatum
illud horrible non nominandum inter Christianos-for all these are

founded on Christianity--" etc.

See page 399.
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the country that is punished, not to force conscience by punishnent, but to preserve the peace of the country by an outward respect to the religion of the country, and not as a restraint upon
the liberty of the conscience, but licentiousness, endangering
the public peace, when tending to corrupt society, is consid-10
ered as a breach of the peace, and punishable by indictment."'
At another place, the point is made that to indulge in invective
against the Christian relijion, in a Christian land and before a
Christian audience is an offense contra bonos mores." Still another suggestion is made that the object of the statute is to prevent impiety, i.e. to increase, or at least to conserve veneration
for God. "If the doctrine advanced in the written argument delivered to the court was just-impiety and profanity must reach
their acme with impunity, and every debating club might dedicate the club-room to the worship of the Goddess of Reason and
adore the deity in the person of a naked prostitute."" Again,
the purpose of the act is intimated to be the avoidance of bad
consequences to the state from the removal of religious and
moral restraint, and it is averred that courts do not act on the
principle of assisting God to "revenge his own cause," nor even
for the spiritual correction of the offender."
It could subserve no good purpose further to consider the objects assigned for the enactment of the statute. More important
is it to know what, in the judgment of the court, that statute
forbids. It does not forbid disbelief of God, Jesus Christ, the
Holy Spirit, the Scriptures. It does not forbid the expression
of doubts in the speaker's mind nor the creation by such expression and by arguments of doubts in the minds of the hearers,
nor, I suppose, actual disbelief. What is forbidden seems to
be the doing these things with a malicious and mischievous in"Page 408. See also p. 399. As teaching this doctrine Story J., understands the decision of Duncan J., in Vidal v. Girard's Exec. 2 How. 127.
"Page 399.
12Page 404. The breach of the peace notion is still in thought, however, for it is added "The people would not tolerate these flagitious acts,
and would themselves punish."
"'Page 404. Blasphemy etc. "are not punished as sins or offenses
against God, but crimes injurious to and having a malignant influence on
society, for it is certain that by these practices, no one pretends to prove
any supposed truths, detect any supposed error, or advance any sentiment whatever." Page 409.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
tention. Such intention, says Duncan J., is "the broad boundary between right and wrong." But what is this mischievous
intention? Not, surely, to produce the disbelief. If the production of disbelief is permitted, the intentional production of
it cannot be prohibited. "It is to be collected" says the opinion
"from the offensive levity, scurrilous and opprobrious language
and other circumstances, whether the act of the party was malicious."'" "It is only the malicious reviler of Christianity who is
punished."
"It is open public vilification of the religion of the
country that is punished-to preserve the peace of the country,"
etc."
It is difficult to assert with any sense of certainty, what the
doctrine is which Updegraph v. Commonwealth was intended to
announce. It probably is not that the state treats Christianity
as true, or the denial of it, or argumentation in support of the
denial of it, an offence. It probably is that a denial with vituperation, or ridicule, before persons some of whom are believers
is an offence. It is to be remembered, in appraising the case, that
the court was about to set aside the conviction, and that it was
prescribing conditions for a conviction so rigorous, that the further effort to secure it became very improbable. So far as this
case teaches, a few tenets of Christianity are a part of the law of
the land in the sense not that the law affirms them to be true,
or denounces their denial, or the propagation of disbelief in them,
but merely in the sense that the law forbids the scurrilous, malicious, malevolent inveighing against them." "Christianity," says
Gibson C. J., "is indeed recognized as the predominant religion
of the country, and for that reason are not only its institutions,
but the feelings of its professors guarded against insult from reviling or scoffing at its doctrines; so far it is the subject of special
favor. But further the law does not protect it."" In 1848,
Bell J., declared "the infidel, who madly rejects all belief in a
Divine Existence may safely do so, in reference to civil punish"Page 406.
"5Page 408.
6
'1
Itis to be observed that the similar of the language imputed to the
defendant, can be heard in dozens of clubs and conventicles, and read in
many books, pamphlets, and newspapers, and nobody thinks of prosecution.
"7Harvey v. Boies, 1 P. & W. 12.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
ments, so long as he refrains from the wanton and malicious proclamation of his opinions with intent to outrage the moral and
religions convictions of a community, the vast majority of whom
are Christians."8
Another statute deserving of notice is that of April 22, 1794s
which punishes any one sixteen years of age or upwards, who
shall "profanely curse or swear by the name of God, Christ
Jesus or the Holy Ghost" with a fine of 67 cents, or imprisonment not exceeding twenty-four hours. It would probably be
held that the purpose of this act was not to assert the existence
or divine qualities of these persons, nor to defend them from the
disrespectful use of their names and of the concept of them; nor
to secure their favor to the state by assisting them in securing
from its subjects the outward form of deference, but to avert a
breach of the peace through the offence occasioned to Christian
people by such profanity, or to preserve the moral effect of the
oaths officially administered. It cannot with any safety be understood as now representing the state's assertion of a few of the
tenets of Christianity, and the state's intention to furnish auxiliaries, in the form of secular punishment, to the sanctions with
which religion represses irreverence. Christianity is not a part
of the law of Pennsylvania, in any other sense than that it cognizes the existence of many citizens who are Christians, and
guards them from exasperation or outrage, by the profanation in
their hearing, of names and ideals held sacred by them.
Besides affirming the existence of certain beings and inculcating reverence for them, Christianity in some forms impresses on
its adherents the duty of hallowing the first day of the week; I
say in some forms, for some founders of sects repudiate the doctrine
altogether.'
Theact of April 22,1794,"1 punishes with a fine of $4,
or with imprisonment for six days, any person who shall be con' 8 Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312. In Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa.
465, Sharswood J., remarks that, even if Christianity is no part of the
law "it is the popular religion of the country, an insult to which would be
indictable as directly tending to disturb the public peace."
193Sm. 178. The act provides a less punishment for persons under 16
years.
2
OCf. the learned disquisition of Reed J., in Sparhawk v. Union Passenger Railway Co., 54 Pa. 401, 432. "There are few things" said Gibson J.,
in Com. v. Lesher, 17 S & R 155, "however simple that stand indifferent
in the view of all the sects into which the Christian world is divided."
213 Sm. 177, 2 P.L. 4406.
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victed of performing "any worldy employment or business whatIf the
soever on the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday."
state has thus required abstention from work because some forms of
Christianity have, it can fairly be said that this doctrine of the
sanctity of Sunday and the injunction to observe it by rest and
worship, have become a part of the law of Pennsylvania; the law
holds Sunday sacred, because Christianity does; the law compels
observance of it, because Christianity does. It must not be overlooked, however, that there are forms of Christianity which hold
that not the first, but the seventh day of the week, must by
Christians be observed as sacred." It is entirely clear that this
Christianity is not a part of the law of Pennsylvania, for the law
not only does not coerce observance of the seventh day, but indirectly penalizes those whose conscience requires them to hallow
it, by compelling them to observe the first day also; thus constraining them to desist from gainful labor two sevenths of their
time.'
The first legislation within this Province, with reference to
Sunday, was had in 1705, and professed to be "To the end that
all people within this province may with greater freedom devote
themselves to religious and pious exercises" and "for the ease of
creation."
It declared that the observance of Sunday which it
was about to prescribe, would be "according to the example of
The act was followed by one in 1786,
the primitive Christians."
which again was followed with substantially the same title and
in substantially the same terms by that of 1794.
Those who enacted these statutes were influenced by various
considerations, one of which doubtless was that observance of the
day was enjoined by Christianity. It is called "the Lord's day."
The example of "Primitive Christians" is vouched. One of the
objects of the legal sanctification of the day, mentioned in the act
of 1705, is, that the people abstaining from labor, may the better
dispose themselves to read and hear the holy scriptures of truth
at home, and frequent such meetings of religious worship abroad
A dictum of
as may best suit their respective persuasions.'""
Woodward J., suggests that the enacters of the statutes, in
making Sunday a civil institution, founded themselves on Di22

Seventh Day Baptists, as in Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312.
2Specht
v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312.
24
1Cf. remarks in Omit v. Commonwealth, 21 Pa. 426.
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vine appointment.'
He suggests also that they regarded it as
"essential to religious freedom," that is, to the enjoyment of the
day for religious purposes, by those disposed so to use it.2' A
brief reference to some of the cases, may better indicate the prevailing view. In Commonwealth v. Wolf,27 a Jew was convicted
of doing worldly work on Sunday. The points discussed by
Yeates J., were, whether, those who keep the seventh day were
within the intention of the act; and whether, if so, the act did
not as to them, violate the constitutional principle, that men may
worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
The first was answered affirmatively. To the second objection
the answer is made (a) that to prohibit work on Sunday, is not
to require work on Saturday, (b) that the command "Six days
shalt thou work" does not require work on six days. Yeates J.,
had "never heard" of such an interpretation. The Talmud does
not make it. He then lays down the principle that laws cannot
be enforced, unless people revere oaths, and believe in a future
state of rewards and punishments. These they will not do, unless they are reminded at stated periods, of their religious duties.
Besides, he suggests a day of rest is needful for the invigoration
of the laboring part of the community. It is to be noted that
there is here no distinctively Christian consideration. The Sunday is set apart not because its hallowing is divinely commanded,
but because the people ought to be religious, and they ought to
be religious, in order that they may the more readily submit to
government.'
The Sunday law was again considered in the Supreme Court.
In 1 8 4 8 ' Specht, a Seventh Day Baptist, was convicted of pursuing his business of cooper, on Sunday, despite his defence that he
n0mit v. Commonwealth, 21 Pa. 426.
26
This thought is expanded by him in Johnston v. Commonwealth, 22
Pa. 102. "It would be a small boon to the people of Pennsylvania to declare their indefeasible right to worship God according to the dictates of
their consciences, amid the din and confusion of secular employments, and
with desecrations on every hand of what they conscientiously believe
to be hallowed time."
212 S & R 48, 1817.
28A similar view is 4uoted from Plutarch by Duncan J., in Updegraph
v. Commonwealth, 11 S & R 394, 405, and was expressed more than once
by ancient philosophers, as well as by Machiavelli and more recent political
29 thinkers.
Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312.
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kept, as in conscience he was bound, the seventh day of the
week. A vehement attack on the constitutionalty ofthestatute,
and on the principle that Christianity is a part of the law, was
made by Thaddeus Stevens, in his argument before the Supreme
Court. Some of the points enunciated by the court are the following: (a) It was a motive with the law-makers, to prohibit
the profanation of a day regarded by them as sacred"0 but it was
also a motive, to secure periods of rest. The last object was
legitimate, and in effecting it, the legislature could properly select a day on which, for whatever reason, a majority of the people would voluntarily rest. Though one of the objects of the
law-givers was to assert the sanctity of the day, they have not,
in so asserting, offended the "religious conscience" of others. (b)
It was not the primary object of the legislature, authoritatively
to assert that Sunday was of Divine Appointment. 3' (c) But
even if the prohibition of labor on Sunday was solely because of
the "imputed holiness" of the day, it did not "control" religious
observance, or, "interfere" with concience, because no attempt
is made to force on others the adoption of the "belief entertained
by the governing power"" or to compel a practice in accordance
with it. The individual is not forbidden to express a different
belief. (d) The Sunday law does not interfere with the right
to worship God according to conscience; nor to support a place
of worship, or a ministry. It prefers no mode of worship. It
does not require Jew or Sabbatarian to desecrate the seventh day,
or to devote the first to religious uses. "Its sole mission is to
inculate a temporary weekly cessation from labor, but it adds
(e) If the
not to this requirement any religious obligation."
defendant believed that he was "as fully bound to attend to his
secular affairs upon the first six days of the week, as to cease
3
Thompson J., in Commonweath v. Jeandell, 2 Gr. 506, remarks that
all Christians regard the Sabbath as of divine origin, yet, it requires statutes to protect its observance.
3Coultier J., held that the law intended to guard the Christian Sabbath from profanation, and not merely to prescribe a day of rest.
"2But by. supposition, the attempt was made to force men to hallow the
day by abstention from work, not because they thought it sacred, but
because somebody else did. If for this reason they can be compelled to
give one seventh of their time and one seventh of their possible earnings,
could they also be compelled to contribute money to support it or other
institutions, which the law-makers thought religiously sacred?
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from labor on the seventh," then, it would be an invasion of his
conscientious convictions. But the words "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy; six days shall thou labor and do all thy
work," etc. do not "rationally" mean, nor did the Jews under-

stand them to mean, that men must work six days; and there
was no sufficient evidence that this was the sense put on the
words by the Seventh Day Baptists."
In Johnston v. Commonwealth' the defendant was convicted
of driving his omnibus on Sunday. The chief question before
the supreme court was whether the act fell within the statutory
prohibition. Arguing against too latitudinarian an interpretation, Woodward J. speaks of Sunday as a "day set apart by Divine

command and human legislation" affirming that it has come
down to us with the most solemn sanctions of both God and
man; "that its primary objects both as a divine and civil appointment are 2est and the 15ublic worshi of Almighty God; that the
statute is necessary, to secure to those who wish to hallow the
day, by worship, the opportunity to do so."'

He asserts "that the

Sunday law protects the right to rear a family" with becoming
regard to the institutions of Christianity, and without impelling
them to witness hourly infractions of one of its fundamental
laws;"8 the right to the good order of society and the increased
securities of life and property which result from a decent observance of Sunday; the right of the poor to rest from labor without diminution of wagesT or loss of employment; the right of
beasts of burden to rest.
33

Even were this the sense put on the words by the defendant, he
would not be protected from the penalties of the statute; Cf. Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 S & R 155, 160; Phillips v. Gratz, 2 P & W 412.
3122 Pa. 102. In Sparhawk v. Union Passenger Railway Co., 54 Pa.
401, Reed J., says that the "cardinal error" of the case was in "treating
Sunday as set apart by the divine command."
nThompson J., in Commonwealth v. Jeandell, 2 Gr. 506, concurs in the
doctrifie that the law gives to the public the right of enjoying Sunday as
a day of rest and religious exercise, free from disturbance Cf. also 54
Pa. p. 423.
"The logic seems to be, Christianity requires hallowing of Sunday; a
paterfamilias has a right to teach this doctrine to his children and not to
have his inculcations refuted in their minds -by the conduct of his
neighbors. Hence this conduct must be made to conform to his inculcations.
31Does he mean that the worker has a right to be paid for six days'
work as much as he would be for seven days' work?

16

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Omit v. Commonwealth' was a conviction for selling from defendant's bar spirituous liquor to a sojourner in his tavern, on
Sunday in violation of the act of 1794. The chief question was
whether the sale was prohibited by the act. Woodward J. in
deciding that it was prohibited indulges in dicta to the effect
that "Rest one day in seven was enjoined by the precept and
example of the Author of our existence, and government, founding itself on Divine appointment, has made it a civil institution. "
The framers of the act of 1794 justly regarded it (the observance
of the first day of the week) as essential to religious freedom,
as well as to physical health and strength. It is an institution
deeply seated in the religious affections of the community and
one of the foundations of public morals, and of our political fabric.
Commonwealth vs. Nesbit" was a conviction of Nesbit for
driving a carriage on Sunday to church. The conviction was
reversed by the Supreme Court, because the driving of the carriage was not within the prohibition. Lowrie C. J. digresses
into a defence of Sunday legislation, in the course of which he
affirms, that an object of the law was that the people should
devote the day to rest, and to worship; that our people are
Christian; that they believe their religion to have suppressed
pagan vices; to have advanced justice, benevolence, truth and
purity, to have purified the family relations; that they believe
the Sabbath and its institutions have been prominent means of
progress, and essential to its continuance. They therefore could
not avoid protecting such a (lay. But by the Sunday law, "wedo
not mean to enforce religion. We do mean to protect our customs,
no matter that they may have originated in our religion, for
they are essential parts of our life."
A resume of these cases will convince us, I think, that it is fair
to say that the act of 1794 forbade work on Sunday, because its
framers thought that Christianity did so. One of its objects was to
add a temporal sanction to the spiritual sanctions of religion. Another cause of its enactment was the fact that the day was largely
believed to be sacred, and the act gave satisfaction to the prevailing reverence for it. Another cause was, that the day was
employed by numerous individuals for religious worship, and its
object was to protect these individuals from disturbance, in such
821 Pa. 426.
3934 Pa. 398.
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worship. Another was to secure rest one day in seven, though
it is certain that this would not have led to the enactment, bad
not the day been believed by the legislators, or the people, to be
divine. Possibly it is correct to say that that small portion of
some forms of Christianity, which forbids secular work on Sunday, has become by the act of 1794 a part of the law of Pennsylvania.'0
Let us pass now to the consideration of other legislation. In
Updegraph v. Commonwealth" Duncan J.. with reference to the
argument that the law against blasphemy was repealed by the
constitutional principles concerning religion, retorts "if the argument be worth anything, all the laws which have Christianity for
their object-all would be carried away at one fell swoop' '-and,
as such laws, he proceeds to mention, the law against cursing and
swearing, the Sunday law, the law forbidding incestuous marriages, perjury, fornication, adultery, buggery, "for all these are
founded on Christianity." If the fact that Christianity condemns these acts, was the conscious inducement to the legislation
against them, it may, in a fair sense, be affirmed that so much of
Christianity as forbids these acts, is a part of the law. There is
but little authentic evidence however, that this is a true version
of their origin. Jews, Mohammedans and Pagans condemn by
law several of these acts. Some of them were penalized in Europe before the advent of Christianity. It is likely that ethical
instincts long inherited, would have led to the same legislation.
As to incestuous marriages, the New Testament has little to say,
and our legislation upon them is Christian only as far as Christianity is Judaic. So far as Christianity has developed and deepened repuguances to the acts enumerated by Judge Duncan, and
these repugnances have led to the legislation, Christianity might
be said to be a part of the law in a very artificial sense, the maxim that Christianity is a part of the law having been intended to
express the principle that the law forbids or commands, with intention to imitate the prohibitions or commands of Christianity,
or to defend or promote some policy because it will promote or
maintain the domination of Christianity.
10In Commonwealth v. Matthews, 152 Pa, 166, Paxson J., seems to hold
that the statute must be administered in 1893 in the sense which it bore
for those who enacted it.
411

S & R 394.
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Let us now examine the limitations on the function of witness
and juror, and see whether Christianity is a part of the law, in
the sense that it shows its distrust of and displeasure at those who
do not believe in Christianity by denying to them the right to
testify or to serve as jurors. A witness must qualify himself to
testify by taking an oath, unless he has conscientious objection
to swearing. An oath is an appeal to God. The witness must
have a sense of accountability to God, and believe that the latter
will punish him if he swears falsely. He does not need to believe in a future state, in the authority of the Bible, or in Christianity." Possibly the jury may consider the fact that the
witness is not a believer in Christianity, in determining his credibility.4
This is the only disability that attaches to the witness
for being a non-Christian. Of the law concerning witnesses, therefore, in no fair sense, is Christianity a part. The Jew, the Mohammedan, the adherent of any theistic creed who attributes to his
Deity the power and disposition to punish falsehood, and the
Christian are impartially received as witnesses. 4
In McFadden v. Commonwealth,45 a prosecution for murder,
a juror was challenged for misconduct as a juror in earlier trials.
At one of these earlier trials after the jury had been out all
night, the juror in question took up the Bible and said he was a
Tom Paine man and would as lief swear on a spelling book as on
that. About a year before, he had also been a juror, and had
said that he had tried to acquit any one the judge desired to have
convicted. The court sustained the challenge. Approving
Black C. J., said "we can see nothing wrong in sustaining the
challenge. It would destroy all confidence in the admistration
of justice, if the most important criminal causes should have to
be submitted to men who show themselves reckless of both human and divine laws."
Precisely what the offence was which
justified the exclusion of this juror is not evident. Was it his
desire to acquit any one the judge desired to convict? But had
2

4 Cubbison

v. McCreary, 2 W & S 262; Blair v. Seaver, 26 Pa. 274;
Witnesses,
P.
45 et seq.
43Blair v. Seaver, 26 Pa. 274.
4"Gibson C. J., remarks in Harvey v. Boies, 1 P & W 12. "But judicial oaths are not founded exclusively on the belief of the Christ an's revelation, a Jew or a Gentile being allowed to swear in the form prescribed
by his faith." The Act of April 23d, 1909, declares that a witness' capacity to testify shall be in no wise affected by his religious opinions.
423 Pa. 12.
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the judge a right to desire to convict? And if he desired to convict, would it be wrong in a juror to desire to acquit? And if
desire to acquit was a disqualification to be a juror, would desire
to convict be a disqualification to be a judge? Was the offence
the possession and display of too much independance under judicial manipulation? The jurorsaid that he was a Tom Paine man;
i.e. doubtless, an approver of Mr. Paine's attitude towards Christianity. Expressing his disbelief of the Divine authority of the
Bible, he said he would as lief swear on a spelling-book as on it.
Was it the belief of this person, that made him unfit, or the bad
taste of his mode of expressing it? It does not appear that he
had sworn on the Bible, and therefore was indirectly declaring
that he did not feel bound by the oath he had taken. On the
whole, it would be unsafe to infer that disbelief of the Bible, being a Tom Paine man, thinking an oath on a spelling book as binding as one on the Bible, would disqualify a juror. The law has not
therefore so far as jurors' qualifications are concerned, made
Christianity a part of itself; i.e. it has not affirmed the truth of
the Bible, which is one of the tenets of Christianity, by disqualifying, as jurors, those who reject it, nor subjected to this
incompetency for any other reason.
Let us now consider tenets which are inimical or are supposed
to be inimical to Christianity. A man, owning a building, may
devote it to the dissemination of unorthodox views concerning
religion, without losing the ordinary guarantees of the law. He
is still regarded as owner. He can defend his property rights by
trespass, or ejectment. The criminal law punishes malicious
mischief upon it, arson of it. No discrimination in the administration of the law, civil or criminal, Would be made against him,
because of his own opinions, or of the manner in which he employs his property to assist in their dissemination. There is one
case however 6 in which it was said, not decided, that a testamentary devise or bequest to a trustee, to propagate infidel notions
would be held void, and the property pass to the heir, or next of
kin. Levi Nice devised land to grand-nieces for life, and after
"Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465. In Manners v. Phila. Library Co. 93
Pa..165, Paxson J., says that "A man may deny the existence of a God, and
employ his fortune in the dissemination of infidel views, but should he
leave his fortune in trust for such purposes, the law will strike down the
trust as contra bonos nwres." No decisions cited support the dictum.
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their death in fee simple, to "the Infidel Society of Philadelphia,
hereafter to be incorporated, and to be held and disposed of by
them for the purpose of building a hall for the free discussion of
religion, politics, etc."
The grand-nieces united with their
mother, as heirs at law of the testator, in a contract to convey the
land to Zeisweiss. A case was then stated to determine whether
the devise to the Infidel Society was void. If it was, the plaintiffs could convey a good title to the defendant, otherwise not.
At Nisi Prius, Thompson C. J., entered judgment for the plaintiffs. On error to the Supreme Court, Sharswood J., held, such
an association could not be incorporated under any existing general law; it is highly improbable that the legislature will ever
incorporate or authorize the incorporation of such an association.
Though possible, such incorporation is Poten/ia remola, involving a possibility on a possibility, viz. that a corporation should
be created, and that it should be created with this name. The
possibility that there would be such a corporation before the close
of the particular estate was too remote. It is true that if the
will made a charitable use, equity would despite the absence of a
trustee named, or the uncertainty that such trustee would be in
existence at the close of the life estate, preserve the trust, provided that there was not such a vagueness in the trust as required
the exercise of a trustee's discretion. This trust is vague, and
its administration requires the exercise of that discretion. But
the trustee named is a society to be incorporated, whose coming
into existence during the life-estate is potentia remota. Hence,
the devise is void as a charity. This is the ground of the decision, for Shaswood J., adds, "In placing the decision on this
ground, however, it must not be understood that I mean to concede that a devise for such a purpose as was contemplated by the
testator, even if a competent trustee had been named, would be
sustained as a valid charitable use in this state."
He does not
concede that such a devise would be sustained, but he does not
decide that it will not be. The case is authority then for the
fact that legislators in this state are and will be averse to providing the facility of incorporation, for the dissemination of antiChristian opinions, and that legislation in that sense within the
lives of the life-tenants, was very improbable. Christianity is
not a part of the law except in the negative sense that trustees
cannot be dispensed with, when valid trusts for the production
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of disbelief are to be created, whose administration would require
discretion. The observations on infidelity added to the opinion
are, in brief these, Charity is love to God and our neighbor;
Love is not promoted by the dissemination of infidelity. Christianity is the popular religion; an insult to it would tend to disturb the peace. The religion of the Bible is not to be openly
reviled, ridiculed or blasphemed, to the annoyance of the great
mass of the people. A hall dedicated to the free discussion of
religion would surely produce these results. Whether a gift to existing persons as trustees, to promote free discussion of religion,
would be held void is not decided.
In Manners v. Phila. Library Co.47 the will of James Rush was
in question. This will directed his executor to purchase a lot,
and erect on it a library building, to convey the lot and building
to the Library Company of Philadelphia, and to convey to this
Company all the residue of the estate. The will directed that no
work should be excluded from the library, because of its difference from the ordinary opinions, in matters of science, government, theology, morals, or medicine. The will also directed that
the Library Company should every ten years publish an edition
of 500 copies of the testator's works to supply any demand. A
bill in equity was filed to declare the trust void; partly on account
of the provisions against exclusion of books, and partly on account of the direction to publish the testator's works some of
which were alleged to deny the truth of the Christian religion.
The bill was dismissed on demurrer, and the decree was affirmed.
Paxson J., observes that the will does not command the inclusion
in the library of every book, however much it may be at variance with orthodox views. The language of the testator is
precatory merely, and not binding. But, the interest of Christianity does not require the debarring of students of theology from
access to heterodox books. He is best armed to defend Christianity, who is familiar with the arguments against it. To enforce the rule contended for, would exclude much of the choice
literature of the past. If the primary object of the trust was to
disseminate infidel views, or to attack the popular religion of the
country, the court would declare it void. As the Library is a
charity, the devise to it will not be defeated because a subsidiary
intent of the testator was the publication of his own works.
The law will strike down the unlawful direction, and leave the
4 93

Pa. 165.
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primary intent untouched. If the directions as to the character
of the books to be put in the library and as to the publication of
the testator's works are unlawful, as they are not conditions precedent, they will be regarded. "If the fact is that the testator's
works are of the character alleged in the bill, it is not likely the
defendants (the executor and the Library Company) will publish
them. No court would compel them to do so." It appears from
this synopsis, that there is no decision to the effect that Christianity is a part of the law. It is said that the courts would not
sustain a testamentary trust chiefly intended to propagate disbelief by the publication or circulation of books. If this dictum is
correct Christianity is so far a part of the law, that the law withholds from owners the power by means of a trust to devote
their property after death, to the inculcation of anti-Christian
opinions.
The next case to be noted, is that of Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 Howard 117. Girard devised large property to the city
of Philadelphia for the erection and maintainance of a college for
the poor. ie required "that no ecclesiastic, missionary or minister of any sect whatever, shall ever hold or exercise any station
or duty whatever in the said college, nor shall any such person
ever be admitted for any purpose or as a visitor within the premises appropriated to the purposes of the college." He desired
that the instructors should take pains to instill into the scholars'
minds the purests principles of morality, so that when of age,
they might evince benevolence, love of truth, sobriety and industry. He stated that his reason for this exclusion was the multitude of sects and opinions, and the desire to keep tender minds
free from the excitement produced by clashing doctrines and sectarian controversy, until on their entrance into active life they
might adopt such tenets as they preferred. A bill was filed in
the Circuit Court of the United States to set aside this devise, for
various reasons, only one of which we here consider, viz., the
provision for the exclusion of ministers, for .the limiting of instruction to morality, and for the prohibition by implication of
all instruction in the Christian religion. With reference to this
objection, Story J., remark, "It is also said, and truly, that the
Christian religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania.
But this proposition is to be received with its appropriate qualification, and in connection with the bill of rights of that state, as
found in its constitution of government." Quoting the constitution of 1790, (which he remarks is like that of 1776 and 1838,) on
subject of worship, and religion, he observes "Language more
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comprehensive for the complete protection of every variety of religious opinion could scarcely be used; and it must have been
intended to extend equally to all acts, whether they believed in
Christianity or not; and whether they were Jews or infidels. So

that we are compelled to admit that although Christianity be a
part of the common law of the state, yet it is so in this qualified
sense, that its divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore
it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed
against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public.
Such was the doctrine of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Updegraph v. Commonwealth 11 S & R 394."
The opinion then suggests that it is unnecessary to consider
the legal effect of a devise to establish a school for the propagation of Judaism, or Deism, or any other form of infidelity. Girard does not say that Christianity shall not be taught-morality
is to be taught and the instructors are not forbidden to teach the
New Testament, as a means of teaching morality. The exclusion of ecclesiastics, is not equivalent to the prohibition of the
teaching of the Christian religion, for laymen can teach it. But,
even if there was no provision for teaching religion; if the instructions to be imparted were simply in reading, writing, arithmetic, geography and navigation, the devise would be a valid
charity. The conclusion reached was that there was nothing in
Girard's devise "inconsistent with the Christian religion," or
"opposed to any known policy of the state of Pennsylvania."
We have here nothing but dicta with respect to Christianity being a part of the law. It is intimated that if Girard had forbidden instruction in any religion at all, the charity established by
him would nevertheless be valid.4"
Protection of various sorts is extended to property devoted to
religion, but there is no indication in statute or decision, that
property devoted to the Christian religion receives any preferential treatment. Thus, the 31st section of the act of March 31st,
18609 punishes any person who shall wilfully and maliciously
disturb or interrupt any meeting, society, assembly at congregation "convened for the purpose of religious worship, or for any
18In Knight's Estate, 159 Pa. 500, a bequest of $1000 to the Friendship
Liberal League, a coporation for discussion, and the improvement of the
intellectual and moral condition of its members, was held a bequest for a
religious use, in the sense of the act of April 26, 1855, and void because
of the death of the testator within one calendar month after making it.
91 P. L. 1166.
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moral, social, literary, scientific, agricultural, horticultural or
floral object, ceremony, examination, exhibition or lecture." The
138th section of the same act prescribes a penalty for burning
any barn, stable, ship, warehouse, bridge etc. or any ,church,
meeting-house, court-house, jail, etc. In neither of these provisions is visible any intention to discriminate in favor of the
Christian religion and against other religions.
While the makers of statutes, and the writers of judicial opinions have indicated their personal belief in Christianity, and while
a vast majority of the citizens of the state are Christian, it is probably correct to say that neither in statute as now understood, nor in
decision, does the state express any belief in the truth of Christianity, that it does not enjoin belief, nor disbelief; that it does not
enjoin abstinence from the expression of disbelief or from writing
and speaking with a view to propagating disbelief; that it does
not require the observance of any institutions, rites, or practices
because the Christian Religion prescribes them, nor prohibit the
doing of any acts because that religion prohibits them.
It may be said, that Christian religion is preferred by the law
to other religions and to irreligion, in that public vilifications of it is prohibited, but of them is permitted; in that the day
made sacred by it, and as such observed by its votaries, is, either
for this reason, or for others, made under penalty a day of abstinence from sundry forms of labor; while no institution of other
religions or of irreligion, is thus defended.; and in that testamentary trusts for the promotion of other forms of religion' or of irreligion will be invalid, if no trustee is in existence, or will probably come into existence when the trust is to commence, and the
administration of the trust requires discretion. It is not surprising then, that so keen a thinker as Gibson C. J., should have
said that "Christianity has been indefvitely said to be a part of
the law of the land" " and that Sharswood J., found it possible
to express the attitude of the law towards Christianity, without
committing himself to that formula.52 Enough to justify the rejection of that formula, is the fact that it is incurably vague;
that in its most natural sense, it is wholly untrue, and that, in
order to make it speak truth at all, an interpretation entirely
artificial must be placed upon it.
5
0It could not be said with confidence that a trust to support Jewish
worship, or to defend Jewish opinions, would not be upheld.
51
Harvey v. Boles, 1 P. & W. 12.
•5 Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465.
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MOOT COURT.
COMMONWEALTH V. WARREN.
Selling Liquor Without License.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Warren, a grocer, advertised a drink which had been represented to
him by his vendor to be non-alcoholic and non-intoxicating.
He believed this representation. He sold a quart of the liquor to John
Slides, who became intoxicated and in that condition committed a crime.
This is an indictment for selling intoxicating liquors without a license.
FRITZ for Commonwealth.
GRAUPNER for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
MESSINGER, J.-The Act of May 18, 1887, P. L. 108, "To restrain
and regulate the sale of vinous, spiritous, malt, orbrewed liquors, or any
admixture thereof," provides in its fifteenth section: "Any person who
shall hereafter be convicted of selling or offering for sale any vinous.
spirituous, malt, or brewed liquors or any admixture thereof, without a
license shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than 500 dollars,
and not more than 5000 dollars and undergo an imprisonment in the
county jail of not less than three months, and not more than twelve

months."
The terms "vinous, spirituous, malt, or brewed liquors" include all
kinds of liquor containing an appre.ciable percentage of alcohol.-Hatfield
v. Commonwealth, 120 Pa. 395; Commonwealth v. Balheim, 15 Sup. 33,
and Commonwealth v. Reyburg, 22 Pa. 299.
In the last case which has been much relied upon by defendant, the
question whether cider, proved to have been sold is vinous, or spirituous
was held to be a question of fact for the jury and not of law for the court.
That case is materially different from the one at hand. There the question
was whether or not the cider was intoxicating, while in this case, the liquor sold by Warren actually intoxicated John Slides.
From the definition of the word intoxicate we can readily assume from
the facts that the liquor contained a sufficient amount of alcohol to bring
it within the terms of the Act.
In Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa. 32, and in Commonwealth vs. Holstein, 132 Pa. 357, it was held that to sustain a conviction for selling intoxicating liquors under act of 1887, it is not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove a criminal intent; if the sale be contrary to law, the
intent is immaterial.
The fact that Warren believed he was selling a non-alcoholic and nonintoxicating drink, does not relieve him of his liability.
It has been held,.one who sells "oleomargarine" in ignorance of its
real nature is nevertheless liable for the penalty imposed by the act of
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1885, which contains nothing to imply that the forbidden act must have
been done knowingly or wilfully; to construe the act as so implying would
depart from its manifest intent. -Commonwealth v. Weiss, 137 Pa., 247.
The principle that one is bound at his peril to ascertain the nature of
the article which he sold, is well established in the Massachusettsdecisions
upon the sale of liquor without a license. Commonwealth v. Boynton, 2
Allen 160., Commonwealth v. Goodman, 97 Mass. 117., Commonwealth v.
Hallett, 103 Mass. 452.
In Commonwealth v. Hallett, defendant sold a bottle containing what
was called "plantation bitters" to a person who got grossly drunk. Defendant was found guilty, the court holding that it was no defence that
the seller believed that what he sold was a medicine or was not intoxicating. Where a statute imposed a penalty upon "any person who shall sell,
or keep for sale naphtha, under any assumed name," a party charged with
the offence was held to be guilty, although he was not aware that the
article sold was naphtha, but believed it to be some other oil.-Commonwealth vs. Wentworth, 118 Mass. 441.
In Commonwealth vs. Burns, 38 Sup. 564, Burns was convicted for
selling liquor without a license, the evidence showing that the beverage
which defendant sold contained 2 per cent of alcohol, had the taste and
smell of beer, and was in fact a malt liquor.
Beaver, Judge, in his opinion said, "Whether or not defendant was put
upon notice of the character of the drink which he sold is immaterial.
It was a malt liquor. He sold it without a license and is therefore as
the jury found, guilty under the indictment."
While to hold Warren guilty, might in this particular instance, work
hardship upon him, yet in. view of the former decisions and that the drink
he sold was intoxicating contrary to the statute and that it would tend
to open an avenue for defense which would be used frequently in avoiding
a conviction, we feel bound to direct a verdict for Commonwealth.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Ordinarily the principle that a criminal intent is a necessary element
of crime applies to statutory as well as to offenses at common law.-?
Cyc. 148.
The principle, however, is not inflexible in the case of statutory offenses.
It is within the power of the legislature, if it sees fit, to dispense with
the necessity for a criminal intent, and to punish particular acts without
regard to the mental attitude of the actor.
The legislature may dispense with the necessity for a criminal intent
either in express terms or impliedly. In the former case there can be no
difficulty; but, when the intention of the legislature is to be implied,
it is often very difficult to say whether a criminal intent is necessary or
not. The question, it has been said, "depends upon the subject matter
of the enactment, and, the various circumstances which make one construction or theother reasonable or unreasonable. "-Regina v. Tobson 23
J. B. D. 168; Beale 289. The question is whether or not, from the language of the statute, and in view of the manifest design and purpose of
the same, the legislature intended that the legality or illegality of the
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act should depend upon the ignorance or knowledge of the party charged.
Com. v. Weiss 139. Pa., 251.
Among the various statutes which the courts have construed as dispensing with the necessity of a criminal intent are statutes regulating
the sale of intoxicating liquors. Thus it has frequently been held that in
a prosecution for the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors, it is no defense
that the seller did not know that the liquor sold by him was intoxicating,
or that he believed it was not intoxicating, if in fact it was.-28 Cyc. 184
(collecting the cases). Likewise it has been held that if one sells liquor
to one who is under age, he is criminally liable, although he was actually
ignorant of the fact, and although he believed that the purchaser was of
full age.-23 Cyc. 194 (collecting the cases). And under statutes making
it a crime to sell intoxicating liquors to habitual drunkards it is generally
held to be unnecessary that the seller should have knowledge of the buyer's intemperate habits, and that ignorance or mistake of fact is no defense.-23 Cyc. 198 (collecting cases).
Unless a criminal intent is expressly required by the statute the courts
of Pennsylvania have uniformally construed the statutes regulating the
sale of intoxicating liquors as not requiring a criminal intent. Such a
construction has been given to statutes prohibiting sales to minors and to
persons of known intemperate habits.-Com. v. Rett, 138 Pa. 615; In Re
Carlson License, 127 Pa. 330; Com. v. Bauman, 20 Pa. C. C. 273; Com.
v. Sellers 130 Pa. 32.
In fact in all the cases which have been decided under the liquor laws
the courts have construed them as providing that any person wvho shall
do the act shall do it at his peril, and shall not be allowed to show in defense that he did not know of the existence of the circumstances rendering the act illegal.
The reasons which led the courts to apply this construction to the law
prohibiting sales to minors and to persons of known intemperate habits,
apply with equal force to the statutes prohibiting sales without a license
and, in view of the overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions, there can be no doubt a similar construction would be placed upon
this statute.
Judgment affirmed.

HENDERSON V. DILL.
Trespass for Damages-Accidental Killing in Self Defense.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Henderson attacked Dill without provocation. Henderson having
no weapon, and Dill having no ground for thinking his life in danger,
Dill stood his ground and returned blow for blow. One of Dill's blows
struck Henderson over the heart, and Henderson, having a weak heart,
fell dead. Mrs. Henderson brings this action of trespass against Dill for
taking Henderson's life.
OPINION OF COURT.
MILLER, J.-At common law no civil action would lie for causing the
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death of a human being, but this state of the law was altered by the
Lord Campbell's act of 1846 which is the basis of the Pennsylvania legislation on that subject. The act of April 15, 1851, P. L. 674, sec. 19, provides that "wherever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or
negligence and no suit for damages has been brought by the party injured during his or her life, the widow of such deceased or, if there be
no such widow, the personal representatives may maintain an action for
and recover damages for death thus occasioned". This is altered by the
act of 1855 only to the extent of the parties entitled to sue, viz: husband,
widow, etc., of such deceased.
Thus Mrs. Henderson can recover damages for the death of her husband provided the condition precedent, upon which her right of recovery
rests, exists. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that her husband's death was occasioned by "unlawful violence or negligence". In
other words was the defendant in default.
Bouvier and Anderson concur in defining default as "the non-performance of a duty, and omission to do that which ought to have been done".
Henderson attacked the defendant and the defendant, in order to protect himself, returned blow for blow. Was the defendant in default in
so doing? We think not. Where one attempts a battery on another, it
would be gross injustice to insist that the party is obliged to submit and
seek protection (?) only in a legal action for damages, or a criminal prosecution. On the contrary, he may oppose violence to violence and the
only limit to this privilege of self-defense is that he must not employ a
degree of force not called for in defending himself from the attacks of
his assailant.-Keep v. Ivallman, 68 Wis. 451; Higgins v. Minageran,
78 Wis. 602; Drew v. Comstock, 57 Mich., 176; Elliott v. Brown, 2 Wendell 497; Brown v. Gordon; 1 Gray 182; Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75.
To sustain her action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
wrongfully invaded a legal right of hers, i. e., that defendant's blow,
which resulted in Henderson's death, was a breach of legal duty which defendant owed to plaintiff's husband. So long as Dill used no more force
than was reasonably necessary in self-defense, he was merely pursuing
his own legal rights and is not liable for any consequences therefrom resulting to others. The archaic theory that "a man acts at his peril" has
long since been exploded and under the law of today a person is not legally
wronged who suffers harm through the doing of a lawful act in a lawful
manner, by lawful means and with due care and caution.-Vincent V.
Stinehom, 7 Vt. 62; Harvey V. Dunlap, Hill & Denis (N. Y.) 193; Brown
v. Hendall, 6 Cush., (Mass.) 292.
Was Dill negligent? There is nothing in the case to show that he was.
He used merely ordinary force, and if Henderson had been a man with a
normal heart, defendant's blow would not have superinduced the consequences that ensued. The act itself and not its consequences to one of
Henderson's condition, is the true criterion whereby to judge the reasonableness of the force used by the defendant. Dill had no knowledge of
the condition of Henderson's heart nor was he chargeable with such
knowledge. He was under no obligation to Henderson to first ascertain
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the condition of his heart before taking steps to protect himself from the
assailant's blows.
Dill was not obliged to "retreat to the wall" before using ordinary
and reasonable force to protect himself. The doctrine of "retreating to
the wah" has no applicability to this case as there is no element of intentional killing involved.
Accordingly, since defendant inflicted the injury complained of, while
engaged in a lawful act, in a lawful manner, without malice or negligence, he violated no legal right due to the plaintiff, and we must hold
that she cannot recover.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The single question presented for determination is whether Dill's death
was the result of "unlawful violence" on the part of Henderson.
It is well settled that a man is justified in repelling an assault by the
exercise of such force as may reasonably appear to him to be necessary.
The right of self-defence is a right to repel force by force. The repellant
force thus permitted must be protective and not aggressive. When protection is achieved the legitimate end of the force allowed is accomplished. Only such force as is reasonably necessary is allowed. The law
makes reasonable allowance for the infirmity of human judgment under
the influence of sudden passion and does not require men to estimate with
mathematical exactness the degree of force necessary to repel an assault;
but it does require that, when a man is assaulted in such a way as not to
endanger his life or threaten great bodily harm, the repellant fQrce must
be of a character not calculated to cause the death of or inflict great
bodily harm upon the assailant.-Bishop's Grim. Law 850, 3 Cyc. 1073;
Clark & Marshall on Crimes 212 and cases collected,
Where one is assaulted by another he is not bound to retreat before
resorting to measures of self defense short of those calculated to cause
death or great bodily harm. "It is certainly true that any citizen may
rightfully traverse the streets or may stand in all proper places and need
not flee from every one who chooses to assault him. "-Com. v. Drum 38
Pa. 22; State v. Sherman 16 R. I. 631; Beale 342. "There seems to be
no necessity for retreating or endeavoring to escape from the assailant
before resorting to any means of defense short of those which threaten
assailant's life. "-May Crim. Law, 62.
If the assailed party is defending himself, using no more force than is
reasonably necessary and which does not threaten life or great bodily
harm, he is not responsible tho his assailant dies as a result of the force
used, because the death is simply the accidental result of a lawful act
performed in a lawful manner. -Clark & Marshall 274; State v. Benham,
14 Iowa 154; Bishop 645. "Nor is it unlawful to repel an unlawful attack, although not a deadly one, and if, in so doing, the assailant is killed,
unintentionally and without the use of excessive force, it is a killing
while doing a lawful act and is excusable."-Wharton on Homicide 573;
Bradburn v. U. S. 64 S. W. 550; Ryan v. State 115 Wis. 488.
In the present case all that appears is that Dill stood his ground and
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returned blow for blow. It does not appear that Dill intended to kill
Henderson, or that the force which he used was of such a character as
would ordinarily be likely to kill, or that the force used was excessive.
Dill had a right to use such force as was reasonably necessary short of
force ordinarily dangerous to life, and the circumstances may have been
such as to render it reasonably necessary for him to return blow for
blow. "The assailed party may repel force by force, and within limits
differing with the facts of the cases give back blow for blow. -Bishop 850.
This court is not satisfied that Dill was engaged in an act of unlawful
violence and the judgment of the learned court below is therefore affirmed.

ADAMS V. ADAMS.
Bill in Equity to Set aside Assignment-Rights of Widow.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Adams, husband of Mary Adams, conveyed his personal property,
in value equal to $75,000 to Samuel Adams, his father, in trust for John
during his life and then for John's brothers and sisters. At the same
time he wrote a will in which he devised a farm worth $4,000 and a house
worth $10,000 to his wife. He died childless. Mary refused to accept
the provisions of the will and she files this bill against Sam'l and the
cestui que trust, to have the assignment declared void as to her, and the
property transferred by it declared to belong to her. John lived four
years after making the assignment during which time he received interest and dividends from the estate.
WILLS for Plaintiff.
MCKINNEY for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
UNDERWOOD, J.-We are not enlightened by the statement of
facts, in regard to the intent of the grantor of this trust, in making the
conveyance under discussion. The simple act, that of making the conveyance, is the only certainty.
The plaintiff chooses to infer a fraudulent intent followed by a fraudulent cenveyance, constituting a fraud such as would be sufficient to give
the widow a right to dower in the particular personalty. In support of
,this the cases of Evans v. Dravo, 24 Pa. 65, Lonsdale's Estate, 29 Pa. 412,
Miskey v. Miskey, 15 Phila. 83 and Hnmmel's Appeal, 161 Pa. 215, are
cited. (The case in 15 Phila. 83 is discarded, not being in point.)
In Evans v. Dravo the court holds that a bond, being a chattel, is the
exclusive property of the husband, yet a married woman has an interest
in her husband's chattels, contingent to be sure, but still such as may be
defrauded. Again, in Lonsdalis Estate the court declares that the wife
has not a vested interest in her husband's personal property while he is
living, so as to enable her to restrain his power of disposing of it in any
legal manner. He is free even to make an absolute gift of it, but he
cannot make a gift on such conditions that he shall be at liberty to use
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and enjoy the estate as before, and that the donee shall have a good title
to it on his decease. This was in reality the finding of the auditor, the
court substantiating it by saying that such was correct, inasmuch as a
widow did have an interest in her husband's personalty that she can be defrauded of, as was decided in Evans v. Dravo.-In Hummel's Estate the
court again holds, substantially, that a husband cannot make a gift and
continue to use and enjoy the estate as before, practically the same opinion being expressed as was in Lonsdale case.
It would seem, by the admission of J. Woodward in the Lonsdale case,
that the last two cases cited, Lonsdale)s Estate and Hummel's Estate,
depend entirely on the decision of Evans v. Dravo.
In 59 Pa. 284, Pingh v. Pringle, an able discussion of the law, on this
particular point, is given by J. Sharswood. To quote-"At common law
a man, who is sui juris and compos'mentis may give away all his personal property, so as to become himself, and leave his wife and children,
penniless. The wife and children have no legal right to any part of his
goods, and therefore no fraud can be predicated of any act of the husband or parent to deprive them of the succession. In 12 Harris 65 (24
Pa. 65) a dictum appears adverse to this view but the question there was
whether, in an action on a bond given in part for the purchase money of
real estate, the purchaser could not set up that the husband had entered
into an agreement not to enforce payment of the bond, which had been
taken in order to induce the wife to execute the deed, and it was rightly
ruled that it was fraud of the wife. The husband then sued on the'bond.
Had he voluntarily surrendered or cancelled it and the action been by his
executor to recover it, an entirely different question would have been
presented." Again, in 4 Watts 91 Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 0. J. Gibson
says, "Who is so ignorant as not to know that a husband may dispose
of his chattels during coverture, without his wife's consent and freed
from every post-mortem claim by her." Again, in 142 Pa. 165 Lines v.
Lines, 0. J. Paxson says that it is the settled law of this state that a
man can do what he pleases with his personal estate during his life.
It appears to the court that the above cited cases establish the law on
this question in Pennsylvania and that such a transaction as here occured
does not constitute such fraud on the part of a husband against his wife
as will entitle her to have the conveyance set aside.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
That a wife has no estate in the personal property of her husband during his life, is often tacitly and expressly assumed. He makes purchases
and contracts debt without her consent, although the effect thereof
may be to lessen or entirely consume his personality. He may even
give his personal property away. He may, says Sharswood, J., "give
away all his personal property, so as to become himself, and leave
his wife and children penniless. * * But as to personal property by gift
inter vivos his power is absolute. "-Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281;
ElImaker v. Ellmaker, 4 W. 91; Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149.
When a sane husband gives away his personality,-all or some of it,he knows that it will not be a part of his estate at his death, and therefore that his wife, if she survives him, will not take any of it. If he
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knows this, he must be held to intend that his wife shall take no part of
it. If doing this act with this intention is a fraud, then if the authorities
cited are correct, the husband can defraud his wife of a share in his
goods. If so acting with such intention is not a fraud, afortioriwill he be
allowed to do it. Sharswood, J., denies that the wife can be defrauded.
"They [wife and children] have no legal right to any part of his goods
and therefore no fraud can be predicated of any act of the husband or
parent to deprive them of the succession".-Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa.
281, (quoted approvingly by Paxson, C. J., in Lines v. Lines, supra).
In Pringle v. Pringle, the decedent had transferred certain judgments
against third persons to a son, George. The trial court, apparently without the disapprobation of the supreme court, told the jury that if the
assignment had been delivered to George it would be effectual, as against
the widow (also administratrix) "whether there was any consideration
or not, or what motive prompted the act." The motive attempted to
be proved was, "to prevent the wife from recovering any of the property. "
Despite this denial of the possibility of a defraudation of the wife by'
the husband's disposing of the personal estate, that possibility is assumed
in other cases. Lonsdale's Estate 29 Pa. 407; Evans v. Dravo 36 Pa. 66;
Hummel's estate 161 Pa. 215; citing Elmaker v. Elmaker, and Pringle
v. Pringle, which contain no qualification concerning "good faith."
Sterrett J. remarks, in Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 198, "Nothing is
better settled than the power of a husband to dispose of his personal
property in good faith, by gift or otherwise, during coverture, free from
all post mortem claims thereon by his widow." In the first of these cases
a trust was created for four brothers. On its face it was to operate at
once, that is; the cestuis que trust were entitled at once to the income.
The settler however in fact received the income until his death. The
auditor vaguely finds that the trust was not designed to take effect until
the settler's death, but he possibly meant no more than that the settler
intended to take the interest until his death. If he intended no interest
of any sort to attach, the assignment was only a testament. The observations of Woodward, J., in Evans v. Dravo are characterized by Shargood, J., in Pringle v. Pringle, supra, as dictum merely. In Hummel's
Estate 161 Pa. 215, A made in 1885, two sealed notes to the nieces of his
first wife. In 1888 he executed three notes to nephews and a niece. The
notes were all payable at his death. He died in 1890. The auditor found
that the notes were made in order to evade the collateral inheritance law,
and to deprive the widow, his second wife, of her just share of the estate.
His will gave her a life estate in a house. Sterrett, C. J., lays down the
proposition that the wife held the position of a purchaser, meaning apparently a purchaser of a share in the personal estate. It would have followed from this that she ought to be preferred to the donees of the notes.
Strangely however, It was held that, as the donees were "not parties nor
privies" to the fraud, the widow was postponed to them. How it could
matter whether they were parties to the fraud is not apparent. They
were volunteers, paying nothing for the notes. But, in any case, they
knew that the widow's share in the personalty would be reduced, if they
were allowed to take $4,000 out of $4,676.97 and it is hard to acquit them
of being a party to the fraud against her, if the husband's reducing her
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share, in order to give a portion of the personality to another, is ipso
facto a fraud. What further element would be necessary to make it a
fraud does not appear.
Dissatisfied with this result seemingly, the court following the auditor,
hit on the ingenious expedient of holding that; while the gift was good,
the widow was entitled to indemnification out of the real estate, at the
cost of the heirs. [The testator died intestate as to all his real estate
except the house devised for life to the widow.] It happened in that
case that the heirs were collateral relatives. It would however be hard
to distinguish collateral from linial heirs, and apparently it follows that
a gift of personalty will be valid even as against children, even when
not as against a widow. Surely children often as much deserve to share
in the father's, as a widow in the husband's, estate.
It is also to be noted that the notes in this case were not payable until
the death of the donor. If the principle of Lonsdale's Estate, 29 Pa. 407
were applied, it would be held that for that reason the arrangement was
virtually testamentary, and hence ineffectaal against the wife's objection.
If the gift of the whole interest in personalty would be valid as against
the widow, the gift of a remainder after the decedent's death ought to
be. As the learned court below points out, the beneficiaries of the trust
partook in no intent to defraud the wife, unless claiming the fund with
knowledge that, if it was secured by them, the wife's share would be
lessened, was a fraud.
It might be convenient to enforce the principle that when a gift of
property is made, to take effect in possession and enjoyment only at the
death of the donor, it shall be as defeasible by his widow as is a testamentary gift. That principle, vaguely hinted in Lonsdale's Estate supra,
is inconsistent with Hummel's estate, 161 Pa. 215. The condition of the
authorities hardly warrants, therefore the promulgation of that principle
in this case.
Appeal dismissed.

EVERITT VS. MASON.
Assumpst-Sale of Land Through Agents-Rights of Respective
Parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Mason told Everitt he would give him $100 if he would sell his house for
$5,000. He told him to go ahead and execute his contract of sale, if he
found a buyer. Everitt sold the house and signed Mason's name to the
contract. Mason refused to convey, and the purchaser sued Everitt and
got $500 damages and $50 costs. Everitt now sues Mason in assumpsit
for $650.
HICKS for Plaintiff
WALTON for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
FOLEY, J.-There are three questions to be disposed of in this case:
Whether the person empowered to execute this contract of sale had suffi-
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cient authority to constitute him an agent, whose negotiations would be
binding on his principal in face of the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds?
(2) Whether or not the contract being binding, and having imposed
obligations on the agent which resulted in damages to him, he can be reimbursed by the principal for such damages?
(3) Whether the right to the commission depended upon the performance of a condition in reality (the procuring a buyer) and the agent would
be entitled to recover, even though the principal refuses to avail himself of the results of the service.
The relation of principal and agent exist where one person is authorized to do acts or make agreements for another, and this authority may
be conferred by deed, by simple writing, by parol, or by mere employment. In the case at bar there was an authorized agency by parol and by
it, the agent could bring third persons into new contractual obligations
with his principal. In Ewing v. Tells, 1 Binney 450, it was held that a
parol contract for sale of lands is good under the Statute of Frauds, to
support an action for damages to same effect-"thAt a written contract with an agent who has merely a parol authority," and that is our
case exactly. There is no doubt that the power of an agent to sell lands
must be in writing under the above act (Mar. 21, -1772) but parol authority is sufficient to negotiate for sale, 14 S. & R. 332. There is no
statute in Pennsylvania that requires directly or indirectly that an agent
shall be constituted by writing, except when he is to convey an estate in
land for a longer period than three years.-1 Grant 50.
From these decisions, we 'have come to the conclusion that the framers
of the act of 1772, had in mind that no conveyance of an estate in lands
shall take place unless the agent be authorized in writing.
It will
readily be seen that to convey land and to make an agreement to convey
are two entirely different things. Consequently, though the agreement
restricted the purchaser in this case, to an acquisition of an interest in
land, and no title in fee simple could be derived under it, an action will
surely lie to recover damages for the non-performance under such agreement.-Bell v. Andrews 4 Dallas 150; 205 Pa. 211; 19 Sup. Ct. 160.
And that according to Duncan, J. in 10 S. & R. 251 "although the
agreement was only with an attorney who had but a parol authority."
Also Tyrell v. O'Connor, 56 N. J. Eq. 448.
The omission from the Pa. Statute of Frauds of the 4th section
of the English statue, was intended to leave the Common Law
unaltered, as to redress for breach of a parol contract by recovery in
damages. The contract consequently was valid and the purchaser could
recover. He has recovered and as to his legal right to recoverfrom the
agent the $500 and the $50 cost, it has been adjudicated in another court
and need not be considered in this connection.
(2) The next question for our consideration is whether we are to indemnify the agent for these damages suffered.
This was not a revocable agency, because the right to revoke was gone
from the time of performance by the agent. According to Huffcutt on
Agency §72, there are two exceptions to the general rule that an agency
is revocable: (1) where agent has power coupled with an interest (2)
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when agent has power coupled with an obligation. A power coupled with
an obligation means a power in the execution of which an agent has come
under obligations to a third person. Huffcutt §89. The plaintiff here
acted in good faith, and in obedience to the defendant's instructions, he
found himself involved in a serious liability by fidelity in discharge of a
duty imposed by the principal, where he was wholly free from'intentional wrong. Every man who employs another to do an act which the
employer appears to have a right to authorize him to do, undertakes to
indemnify him for all such acts as the agent does not know to be unlawful, and as would be lawful if employer had authority he pretends to have.
-D'Arcy v. Lyle 5 Binney 441, 1 Rawle 126; Story on Agency §339. I
take the law to be as laid down by Erskine in his Institutes. 2 Ersk.
Inst. 534, "that damages incurred by an agent in the course of the management of the principal's affairs or in consequence of such management,
are to be born by the principal. It is upon this principle that we have
our equitable law of "subrogation". In all such cases, a promise of indemnity is implied, upon the plain dictates of reason and natural justice.
-Parsons on Contracts, 87; Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66.
Judge Yeates says in 5 Binney 444, "where a factor has acted faithfully
and prudently within the scope of his authority, he is entitled to protection from his constituent and compensation for compulsory payments
exacted against him under the form of law for the transactions of his
agency. "
(3) The next and last question is whether the agent is entitled to his
stipulated commission of $100. Mason told Everett to go ahead and execute his contract of sale, if he found a buyer for $5000; and that he.would
give him $100; and we find that every condition of the agency has been
fulfilled. A decided case in Pennsylvania to fit this statement of facts, I
have been unable to find; but- it is well settled that when one of the contracting parties either prevents or waives the literal performance of a
condition precedent, which the other is ready and offers to fulfil, he cannot
avail himself of such non-performance, to relieve him from his own obligation.-Young v. Hunter 6 N. Y. 204; Carmon v. Pultz, 21 N. Y., 549;
Goss v. Broom 31 Minn. 484.
I take the law to be that if any agent undertakes merely to produce a
person who is ready, able and willing to enter into a specified transaction with the principal on the terms prescribed by the latter (and such
are the facts in this case), the production of such a person generally entitles the agent to the contract compensation, although the principal
fails or refuses to enter into the transaction in question.-1 Cyc. 506;
Huffcut Agency §96; Bender v. Bender, 37 Pa. 419.
And this right to commission does not depend on whether or not the
contract with the purchaser is specifically enforced. -McLaugilin v.
Wheeler, 1 S. D. 497; Kelly v. Phelps 57 Wis. 425; 15 Pa. Sup. 250.
Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa. 266 is not adverse to this doctrine because in this case the condition was performed before "revocation" if
there was any "revocation."
My view is that there could be no revocation, when there was nothing to revokq, the agency having been terminated when the condition precedent was performed. In 53 Pa., 266, there
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was evidence that Buttermore revoked the power of attorney, and Blackstone had notice of the revocation before he entered into the article with
Davidson. No such revocation before execution of the power in this
case, and we deem the plaintiff entitled to his commission.
Judgment, accordingly, for plaintiff for $650.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Had Everett had the authority to bind Mason, the purchaser would have
been able to obtain specific performance of the contract. The facts do
not distinctly appear, but it is possible that the land which the purchaser
would thus have obtained, would have been worth $5,500. Were that so
he has lost $500, by reason of his inability to compel Mason to perform.
This, probably, is the reason of his having secured a judgment for $500
damages, in his suit against Everett.
The question before the court was whether Everett, having thus lost
$500 by reason of Mason's repudiation of the contract, may recover it
from Mason. Everett was bound to know the law, and therefore knew
that he could not make for Mason a contract which would compel the
latter to suffer a specific performance. Was he then bound to refrain
from making the contract ? We think not. He was orally directed by
Mason to make it. He was not required to suspect that Mason would
repudiate the contract that should be made. On the contrary, he was
justified in assuming that Mason would honor the contract. When then,
relying on Mason's willingness to perform, he made the sale he had a
right to be saved from loss on account of Mason's refusal. While the
judgment in the suit against Everett is res inter alios acta, we must, in
this case assume that the facts justifying the judgment appear here.
That Everett earned the commission of $100 is indisputable. He found
the purchaser, he made the contract for the designated price. It was
not alleged that the purchaser was unable or unwilling to pay the purchase money agreed upon. Having done that for which the $100 were
offered him, he is entitled to recover that sum.
Judgment affirmed.

